Philosophy Responses

Moral Luck
A philosophical issue related to free will has been discussed by figures such as Bernard Williams
and Thomas Nagel; it is often called “Moral Luck.” This issue is adjacent to, and may be thought
of as part and parcel of, the problem of free will—although it is somewhat different. The
problem starts off with an intuitive assertion, an assertion that seems deeply rooted in the human
moral psyche as such, namely, that we are morally assessable only to the extent that what we are
assessed for depends on factors within (or under) our control. Many theorists call this “the
control” principle. It is intuitive, compelling, and is intuitively believed by both philosophers and
non-philosophers. It seems so commonsensical that rejecting it wholesale seems utterly
irrational. The authority of morality seems to depend upon it.
Simple applications of this theory might be as follows: Suppose Jack intentionally and
maliciously pushes Mary into another person, causing that person bodily harm. Who should we
blame in such a case? Would it be morally correct to punish Mary? The movement of her body
was utterly against her will and was solely the result of Jack’s maliciously pushing her. In such a
case, wouldn’t it make more sense to blame Jack, and thereby punish Jack? Commonsense would
suggest as much. In another typical kind of case, suppose that late one night a driver—haven
taken all precautions and abiding by all the rules of the road—runs over and kills a cat that
suddenly, and unexpected, darts in front of the vehicle. It would surely seem wrong to blame the
driver in such a case. Only a “telepath” or “clairvoyant” would have been able to predict the
animal’s movements in such a way as to avoid its untimely death.
The Moral Luck theorist holds that a great deal of human life, if not almost all of human life,
involves moral luck (or varying degrees of moral luck). Human beings are thrown into a wild
world over which we have very little control. We have little control over the circumstances of
our life, the way things turn out (or play out), the circumstances in which we find ourselves, the
traits and dispositions that make us who we are (–such as our facticity, economic circumstances,
gender, genetic makeup, etc.–); moreover, one has no control over how one is determined by
antecedent circumstances (–this is the classic case of free will reemerging once again–). Do you
think "Moral Luck" theory might, in any way be true? Why / why not?

# 2.
Plato defined knowledge as "Justified true belief." This definition went virtually unchallenged
until the 1960's when Gettier proposed that all three conditions could be meet without yielding
knowledge. Let us look at a "Gettier" type example.

Suppose Mr. Chen is watching the world's cup this year, 2020. Just like last year, the same two
teams are in the championship–Denmark and New Zealand. The game is much the same as it
was last year, same players, same scoring, etc. Last year Denmark won the championship in the
last 5 seconds as its star player kicked a winning goal. Mr. Chen is watching with intensity.
However, unbeknownst to him, the cable station / internet service makes an error. In the last 5
seconds of this year (2020), they replay the last 5 seconds of last year's championship game
(2019). As it so happens, in reality (–in 2020–), Denmark did in fact win the championship in
the last 5 seconds of the game as its star player (–the same person as last year–) kicked a
winning goal. The station immediately switches back to this year's broadcast. But Mr. Chen only
saw the 2019 footage, which is virtually identical to that of 2020.
Now, consider the following:
1. Mr. Chen has a belief that Denmark won the world cup in 2020.
2. It is true that Denmark won the world cup in 2020.
3. Mr. Chen is justified in his belief because he "saw" the winning goal being kicked by the star
player. (When he says things like, "Wow, the star player just won the game," it is true.)
On the face of it, Mr. Chen seems to meet the criteria for knowledge as Plato set the terms.
Conditions (1)-(3) seem to be met.
However, do you think that Mr. Chen really knows that Denmark won? Does he really have
knowledge??? Remember, he saw the last 5 seconds from 2019, not 2020. It seems as though he
has a true belief and it seems to be justified, yet it does not seem to be knowledge.
This is the infamous "Gettier problem: Someone can have a justified true belief without it being
knowledge.
Is Gettier correct?? From the year of publication, 1963 into the 1990's thousands of articles were
written by professional philosophers to analyze these types of examples.

# 3.
Two of the main questions regarding Sextus' Pyrrhonist Skepticism (–which is our most
complete reconstruction of Pyrrhonism–) are:
(A) Is "ataraxia" (–"mental tranquility"–) a worthwhile goal for a scientific enterprise? (This is,
I contend, a very strange axiological goal.)

(B) Is it even possible to "live" life as a Pyrrhonist type Skeptic? (Remember, action involves
"intentions;" and "intentions" involve beliefs about the world, which are not allowed as they are
all suspended ("epoche").
#4.
Chapter 8 primarily deals with radical external world skepticism. An interesting philosophical
problem related to external world skepticism is called, "The Problem of Other Minds."
Descartes, the main subject of Chapter 8, also invoked this puzzle. It goes as follows:
I know that I have a mind, as I am immediately and directly aware of my own consciousness and
the contents of my own mind. I know my own mind immediately and directly. I am always in
"direct" contact with my own mind. However, I never experience any other mind. I infer that
other people have minds based upon their behavior. When someone talks or acts a certain way I
simply take it for granted that the other has a mind and is in a mental state. If someone cries out
and grabs her foot, I take it that she is "in pain" (which is a particular mental state). But I am
never directly aware of any mind outside of my own. It might be the case that there are no other
minds at all, and that I am being tricked by a cleaver robot that is programed to "act" like it has a
mind. How could I ever be certain that anyone else has a mind? What, exactly, justifies a belief
that other minds exist? Justifying that I have a mind is easy. I am immediately and directly aware
of my own mind. But justifying the claim that someone else has a mind is quite different. All that
I am ever acquainted with is behavior, which could be produced by something that does not
really have a mind (like a robot or computer). Behavior alone does not prove conclusively that a
thing has a mind. A sophisticated robot could be programed to act like it has a mind. It could be
programmed to express emotions, unique thoughts, and everything else that we associate with
minds. Nevertheless, the question remains: What justifies the belief that other minds exist? How
could I distinguish between: (1) a thing that looks and behaves like it has a mind but does not (–
what philosophers call "zombies"–); and (2) a thing that behaves like it has a mind because it
does (in deed) have a mind??
#5.
Consider chapter 9:
Is prenatal non-existence the mirror image of (or symmetrical to) postmortem nonexistence? This
is the MIA problem.

#6.
Liar Paradox
The Liar's paradox has tormented philosophers since antiquity. In fact, ancient rumors claim that
Philetas of Cos worried so much about this paradox that it actually caused his death! The
paradox is super easy to state, but bewildering to solve.

Here is the paradox: "What I am now saying is false."

Is what the speaker says true or false? If it is true, it is false; if false, then it is true.

How should we respond to such a paradox?

Professional philosophers typically utilize extremely complex formal logic to deal with the
puzzle. But poor Philetas of Cos lived thousands of years before such logical systems arose. How
would you respond to this paradox?